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 Abstract 
Manufacturing is undergoing a revolution. Teamwork, job-rotation, multitasking are 
superseding the Taylorist mode of organization. The skilled workforce, armed with 
automated machines, is gradually substituting and replacing the unskilled. At the same 
time the U.S. economy is experiencing record breaking growth. Is faster growth a 
consequence of this manufacturing revolution? We study this by inserting dynamic career 
choice into endogenous growth by human capital accumulation. The answer is 
affirmative: The gradual substitution of the unskilled by the skilled boosts the long-term 
growth trend. The model also explains worsening wage inequality between as well as 
within the skilled groups. 
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 1.  Introduction 
We are living in an exciting period of our time. After a century of economic development 
built on division of labor, specialization and the exploitation of scale economies, the 
mode of operation in manufacturing is “undergoing a revolution”.1 Recently Lindbeck 
and Snower (1996) write, “Charlie Chaplin at the conveyor belt, in the movie Modern 
Times, is no longer the prototypical worker” (p.315). Likewise, the meaning of ‘scientific 
management’ has been completely revolutionized since the days of Frederick Taylor 
(1911). The Taylorist method of timing work efficiency by stopwatches, providing 
incentives by piece-rate pay, separating planning from operations, and delineating 
authority rigidly are now grossly obsolete. Modern industrial catchwords are teamwork, 
multitasking, job rotation, ‘just-in-time’ and ‘total quality’ management. 
The obvious question is this: If the modus operandi in manufacturing and scientific 
management is being revolutionized, what happens to the engine of growth? Such 
‘holistic’ organizations, to borrow Lindbeck and Snower’s term, are thought to have 
spread in the United States in the 1980’s.2 By 2000 all US growth records were broken 
since records began in 1850, with the economy forging ahead at a prolonged 3-4 percents 
growth instead of the 1-2 percent earlier.3 Is this all a coincidence? Are the growth 
miracle and the manufacturing revolution connected? Are we seeing a glimpse of at least 
some tendency of higher sustainable growth in the long run? 
 To reexamine the growth engines we could look into human capital accumulation 
(Lucas, 1988), horizontal innovation (Romer, 1990), or vertical innovation (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992) for evidence and clues. In this paper I restrict my attention to the first of 
these three channels.4 Our question may be rephrased as follows. What are the impacts of 
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 modern manufacturing and management on the mechanics of human capital 
accumulation, and in turn on the speed of endogenous long-term growth? An immediate 
task, which will occupy the remainder of this brief introductory section, is to contrast the 
old manufacturing mode with the new, with a view to identify useful building blocks to 
modify the growth mechanics of Lucas (ibid.). 
 In the traditional Taylorist factory each worker performs a relatively simple task, 
supposedly driven to his/her maximum productivity via specialization and scale 
economies. This had two effects on workers and their skills. On the one hand it 
‘degrades’ and thus reduces the demand for skills.5 On the other hand, it makes the 
unskilled worker an indispensable part of the production process. Everyone in the vertical 
organizational structure is assigned a specific and specialized task. Each task may be 
repetitive and meaningless, but production could not have carried on without this army of 
the unskilled. By substituting and thus supplanting the craftsman’s skill as an essential 
part of manufacturing, the mass production machine in the Taylorist factories have also 
made the unskilled a complementary and indispensable part of the production process. 
 The modern manufacturing unit differs from the Taylorist one in two important 
respects. First, the relentless progress of automation has superseded much of the single-
purpose operation that once so degraded the work and the dignity of the unskilled. 
Second, the horizontal ‘holistic’ structure, the emphasis on decentralized decision-
making and information sharing have greatly reduced the hierarchical distance between 
job-designations. The demand for skills has increased. By the same token the unskilled 
are in ever-decreasing demand. Gradually they are substituted out of production by 
automation, teamwork and multitasking. It is almost ironic that the Taylorist organization 
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 degraded yet preserved the indispensability of the unskilled. By contrast the modern 
organization has lifted the demand for skills, and yet it begins to squeeze the unskilled 
out of the production equation. 
 Thus the relationships between capital, skilled and unskilled labors have clearly been 
transformed from the days of Taylor. It is this shift in factor relations that I want to 
incorporate into and modify Lucas’s growth engine. There has been considerable 
evidence, both theoretical and empirical, pointing to the fact that capital is 
complementary to skills.6 But Goldin and Katz (1998) point out that this capital-skill 
complementarity is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the early history of automobile 
production, technological advances together with physical capital substituted for skilled 
labor, only later advances such as automation complemented it. 
 Much of the discussions on capital-skill complementarity and skill-biased 
technological change have concentrated on the skilled. How about the unskilled? Fallon 
and Layard (1975) show that it is useful to treat capital and skilled labor as a 
complementary composite unit, which is then taken to be substitutable to the unskilled in 
a two-level CES production function. To focus on human capital accumulation as much 
as possible I want largely to abstract from physical capital.7 It turns out that it suffices to 
consider the skilled-unskilled relation alone in a production function such as , 
with s and n standing respectively for units of the skilled and the unskilled (‘raw’ labor). 
The manufacturing revolution is therefore construed in our simple model as shifts in the 
relations between s and n. To reiterate, in the Taylorist, mechanical, and vertical structure 
the skilled are more complementary to the unskilled. Substitution for the unskilled was 
limited until the advent of automation. By contrast, in the modern organization teams of 
),( nsf
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 skilled engineers (armed with automated machines) have become increasingly more 
substitutable for the unskilled.  
 Abstracting from physical capital produces results that are simple and intuitive. It is 
good to state the intuition of our main conclusions at the outset. We wish to study growth 
driven by human capital accumulation. But human capital is embodied only in the skilled, 
who improve over time through education. The unskilled do not train and they stagnate 
by comparison. Preserving a large unskilled workforce, like in the Taylorist factory, 
retards growth. Automation and the modern organization release and induce more labor 
to accumulate human capital, which stimulates growth. The answer to the question posted 
earlier is a positive one: The manufacturing revolution unambiguously raises the 
sustainable growth trend.8 In addition, our model shows that this process worsens not 
only the wage disparity between the skilled and the unskilled, but also that within the 
skilled profession itself. The intuition is again simple. The larger between-group disparity 
is needed to induce more workers to train and to stay longer in schools. But some less 
intrinsically able individuals will have to be included into the augmented skilled 
profession. The greater wage disparity within the skilled group is a direct reflection of 
greater heterogeneity among them.  
In terms of modeling, our paper brings together two dynamic mechanisms from the 
recent theoretical literature. The first one is the Uzawa (1965) and Rosen (1976) model of 
human capital accumulation, simplified and adopted by Lucas (ibid.) as the centerpiece of 
the mechanism of endogenous growth. The second is the dynamic mechanism of career 
choice between the skilled and unskilled, featuring in various ways in recent papers on 
wage inequality (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Eicher, 1996; Galor, Oded and Tsiddon, 1997; 
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 Acemoglu, 1998; Galor and Moav, 2000; Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa, 2001). Our 
contribution is to show that inserting endogenous career choice into the Uzawa - Rosen - 
Lucas framework can shift endogenous growth trend rates, and at the same time explains 
wage inequality.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section connects of 
human capital accumulation and career choice. Section three establishes the results under 
two corner solutions of perfect substitutability and complementarity. Section four shows 
that the result holds in non-corner situations. Section five is concerned with wage 
disparities. Section six summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The Dynamics of Growth and Career Choice 
Lucas (1988) adopts a simplified linear version of the Uzawa (1965) and Rosen (1976) 
mechanism linking the rate of human capital accumulation to its level. The Lucas growth 
engine (in discrete time periods) is  
)](1[)()()1( tuththth −=−+ δ ,           (1) 
where  is current level human capital, )(th δ  is the constant “effectiveness  of investment 
in human capital”, and [  is the proportion of time a representative individual 
spends off work training.  
)](1 tu−
Our first step is to abandon the representative individual assumption and to 
distinguish the skilled from the unskilled. Every citizen is different and would choose to 
attend school for varying amounts of time. Ignoring population growth we denote the 
constant population size by L. Equation (1) becomes  
7 
 ∫ = −=−+ Li i dituththth 1 )](1[)()()1( δ .         (2) 
The size of the integral term  depends on endogenous career choice in the 
economy. Since  increases with (a) the proportion of L who choose to train 
in order to join the skilled, and (b) the amount of time each individual spends on training, 
so do the speed of human capital accumulation and the rate of growth. 
∫ = −Li i ditu1 )](1[
di)]∫ = −Li i tu1 (1[
Each discrete time period have unit length. Suppose in any t the economy has one 
final perishable product  produced with a constant returns to scale technology using 
two inputs, namely (effective units of) skilled labor , and (‘raw’ units of) unskilled 
labor . The particular production technology will be specified later but for the 
moment we take it in general as 
)(tx
)(ts
)(tn
)](),([)( tntsftx = .              (3) 
At the beginning of each period a generation of size L is born. Each individual lives 
for a single period in which he/she trains, works, consumes and at the end passes away 
without material bequest. Much of the career choice dynamics hinges on the description 
and composition of . )(ts
Lucas (ibid.) stresses the point that human capital accumulation is a social activity. 
In the present context the external effect of this activity takes the form of knowledge 
augmented and passed on one generation to the next. At birth a generation t inherits 
knowledge level h  from their forefathers, augmenting it through training (education) 
in the form of (2), and passes it on to their offspring in t+1. Let the aggregate effective 
skilled labor units at period t be  
)(t
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 dituthts
tz
i i∫ == )(1 )()()(             (4) 
where  as specified earlier is inherited human capital level,  is the total 
‘headcount’ of the skilled workforce. The ith skilled worker devotes a portion of his/her 
unit time endowment  working instead of training, i
)(th )(tz
1[1)(0 ≤≤ tui )](, tz∈ . In so doing, 
the ith skilled worker offers )()( tuth i)(tsi =  units of effective skilled labor power for 
productive employment. Without loss of generality the constant population size is 
henceforth set to unity. It follows that 1)()( ==+ Ltntz . 
 Let (ai  denote individual i’s intrinsic (cognitive) ability at birth prior to training (if 
any). Assume further  is uniformly and independently (and time-invariantly) 
distributed along the unit segment, 
)t
)(tai
]1,0[)( ∈tai
)(twn
. Unskilled labors use instead raw 
physical strength, which is assumed constant across the population. Unskilled wage 
(equal to earnings per head at t), denoted , is therefore identical across the 
unskilled workforce. The earnings of a skilled worker, by contrast, depend on the skilled 
wage, the time he/she spends at work, and the inherited human capital level. Thus we 
have  
)()()()( thtutwtw i
sz =             (5) 
where  is salary per effective skilled unit of labor and is uniform across the skilled 
workforce. 
)(tws
 Cognitive ability (ai  reduces the time (denoted )t )(1)( tut ii −≡τ ) individual i needs 
to train in order to enter the skilled profession. A general representation of the training 
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 technology may be 0)],([)( <= iii dadGtaGtτ . To simplify the algebra we adopt the 
following formulation 
)(tai−
)()( tat ii =
)(ˆ t ˆ1 u−
)()()(ˆ)( twthtat ns =
1)(ti =τ .              (6) 
 Since it readily follows that u , this formulation has the convenient 
interpretation that each qualified skilled worker devotes to work strictly according to 
his/her intrinsic cognitive ability. 
 Equilibrium career choice is defined by a particular individual with ability a , 
devotes a fraction u  working, a fraction [
)(ˆ t
)](t training, and in so doing earns the 
same either as skilled or unskilled. Thus we have 
. Rearranging,  )()(ˆ)( thtutws = w
)()(
)()(ˆ
thtw
twta s
n
= .             (7) 
 The equilibrium value of ]1,0[)(ˆ ∈ta  plays a pivotal role in this model and has the 
following interpretation. First, relative market wages )()( twtw sn
)(ˆ) ta=
 reflect relative 
derived demand for factors; it thereby reflects factor-substitutability of a particular 
production technology. Second, human capital  is inherited from the past and is 
treated as an exogenous parameter at t. Thus the right-hand side of (7) fully reflects 
relative demand for factors at t. Third, from the uniform distribution of ability, the supply 
(denoted by superscript ‘s’) of unskilled labor is , and the supply of skilled 
headcounts is [ . Given training technology (4), the value of  completely 
)(th
(ns t
)](ˆ1 ta− )(ˆ ta
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 determines the supply of effective skilled-labor units since s . 
Substituting u  and evaluating the definite integral, we have 
∫= 1 )(ˆ )()()( ta is dithtut
)()( tat ii =
2
1[)()( thts −=
)(tx
)(ˆ ta
)(ˆ ta
=−+ )()1 hth
)()( tat ii =
)()1( tht =−+
)(ˆ ta
(aˆ
0)(ˆ =ta
1)(ˆ =ta
])(ˆ 2tas .            (8) 
 In an equilibrium to be defined shortly, ]1,0[)(ˆ ∈ta  captures fully the relative supply 
of factors at t, and via (7) determines equilibrium career choice contingent on factor 
substitution as well as other characters in the production technology for . 
Furthermore,  fully describes the dynamic link via social human capital 
accumulation activities. We can rewrite equation (2) as 
∫ −1 )(ˆ )](1[)(( ta i ditutth δ . 
Substituting u  and evaluating the definite integral, the speed of technical 
progress via social human capital accumulation is expressed only in terms of  and δ  
]
2
)(ˆ)(ˆ
2
1[)(
2tatathh +−δ .        (9) 
 The intuition of  determining the speed of technical progress and human capital 
accumulation is simple, and is revealed in its starkest form in two limiting cases 0) =t  
and . If  every individual in the society chooses to acquire skill and the 
unskilled profession is empty. Human capital accumulation proceeds at its maximum 
speed (
1)(ˆ =ta
)2/δ . If  no one in the society train for skill and the skilled profession is 
empty. Social human capital accumulation grinds to a complete standstill. The next 
section shows that these limiting cases correspond to perfect substitutability and perfect 
complementarity. Section 4 generalizes it to non-corner situations. 
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 3. Two Limiting Cases: Perfect Substitutes and Complements in Production  
We will show that the two corner cases of career choice, 0)(ˆ =ta  and a , 
correspond to the two corner solutions of perfect substitution and perfect 
complementarity between the skilled and the unskilled. Recall that Charlie Chaplin in 
front of the conveyor belt was ridiculed yet indispensable (like a perfect complement) in 
the production process. In the holistic organization they are gradually substituted by the 
skilled. 
1)(ˆ =t
 
3.1. Perfect Substitutability and Maximum-Speed Growth 
Assume for the moment an effective unit of skilled labor is a perfect substitute to a unit of 
unskilled labor. The (constant returns to scale) production function has the form 
)()()](),([)( tntstntsftx βα +==          (10) 
where α  and β  are positive constants. The minimized cost function takes the form 
. The (Kuhn-Tucker) solution for the 
firm’s cost-minimization is 
)(]/)(/)(min[)]((([ txtwtwttwwc nsns βα +=), x),t



=>⇔<
>=⇔>
>>⇔=
.0)(,0)()()(
;0)(,0)()()(
;0)(,0)()()(
tntstwtw
tntstwtw
tntstwtw
ns
ns
ns
         (11) 
Assume initial human capital stock  at 1)0( >h 0=t  when we begin our inquiry.9 
We will return to examine this assumption shortly. Since a skilled worker possesses 
 effective units of labor power, at least some able newborn at t  would find 
it worthwhile to train and join the skilled profession provided  is sufficiently large. 
We will also return to this shortly. 
)()( tuth i 0=
)0(h
12 
 There are three cases from (11) to consider. In the first case, suppose , 
and  hold. From (7) we have 0
)0()0( ns ww =
0)(,0)( >> tnts 1)0(/1)0(ˆ <=< ha
)()1( tht >
. This confirms the 
conjecture in the last paragraph, namely that the skilled profession will be non-empty for 
as long as  since the most able individual hardly needs to train to acquire skills. 
Now  links up production substitutability with the dynamic process in the model. For as 
long as , the education process is active, human capital accumulation proceeds by 
(9) and  holds. By similar argument h
1)0( >h
aˆ
1)(ˆ <ta
)0()1( hh > +  for all t. Feeding this back 
into (7), the skilled profession grows [ )](ˆ ta)1(ˆ ta <+  until 0)(ˆ =ta  for some finite t  
and the unskilled profession is empty. From then on everyone trains for skill; human 
capital accumulates at its maximum speed 
0>
2)(
)()1( δ=−+
th
thth
0)
. National output, since (10) 
takes the form  when )(tas)(tx = ( =tn , grows at the same maximum speed 2/δ . 
 The third case in equation (10) is just a special case of that discussed in the last 
paragraph. With the unskilled profession already empty from the start, i.e. a  for 
, both human capital and national incomes grow at a maximum speed 
0)(ˆ =t
2/0≥t δ . A low-
ability individual chooses the skilled profession by spending a large fraction of his/her 
time training, even though , since his/her earning is greater than remaining 
unskilled. The spillovers from human capital are at its maximum. Using the skilled 
earning per head (5), this implies , i.e.,  
which will be true when h  is sufficiently large. 
)()( twtw ns <
)(twz =
)(t
)()()()( twthtutw ni
s > 1ui )()( >tht
 The only remaining case is the second in equation (11), namely , and 
. This implies 
)0()0( ns ww >
0)0(,0)0( >= ns 1)0(ˆ =a . Since the skilled profession is empty, no one 
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 gets trained and the social human capital accumulation process is at a standstill. 
Reflecting on the skilled earning per head (5), we know 
. But this inequality must be true even for the most able 
individual who has 
)0()0()0()0()0( ni
sz whuww <=
)0()0( 1== ii ua . We infer therefore 1)0( <h  holds strictly under 
. We dismiss this case as intuitively meaningless using the argument in 
footnote 9.
)0()0( ns ww >
1)( ≥th
10  
2/δ
min{)](),([)( tntsftx α==
α β /)(ts
β/)(t (wn
 A quick intuitive summary of our argument is in order. The definition of skill 
restricts our attention to . Perfect substitutability implies 1)(ˆ0 ≤< ta
(ˆ ta
 at some 
arbitrary initial time t. What we have shown is that the process of human capital 
accumulation once started will not stop until we reach the corner solution  in 
finite time. Everyone trains; both human capital and national income grow at its 
maximum speed 
1) =
.  
 
3.2. Perfect Complementarity and Growth Stagnation 
Assume an effective unit of skilled labor is a perfect complement to a unit of unskilled 
labor. The production function has the form 
)}(),( tnts β          (12) 
where  and  are positive constants. Production must use α  units of skilled labor 
and n  units of unskilled labor whatever are  and . The derived relative 
demand between effective skilled labor units and unskilled labor is 
)(tws )t
α
β=
)(
)(
t
t
n
s .  
14 
  Again let h  at initial time period 1)0( > 0=t . The supply for skilled units is given 
by (8) and the supply for unskilled labor is simply . Equating relative demand and 
supply yields the equilibrium condition 
)0(aˆ
α
β=0(h −
0(ˆ2
ˆ1[)
a
a
)
])0( 2 . This quadratic equation in 
 has two solutions )0(aˆ αβ /]2α 2 +β )0([)0(ˆ 2±−= ha . Only the positive solution is 
economically meaningful, thus 
0
)0(
)0(ˆ
222
>++−= α
βαβ h
a .          (13) 
The inequality follows from the intuitive restriction . 1)( ≥th
 Now invoke the human capital accumulation process (9). Equation (13) feeding into 
(9) implies  if )()1( thth >+ 1)(ˆ <ta . Using this in (7) implies 0)(ˆ >dttad . Long-term 
equilibrium has a  approaching unity. More precisely, the skilled profession eventually 
shrinks to a single most able individual, who devotes his/her entire time-endowment 
working. Human capital accumulation and national income growth grind to a complete 
standstill. 
)(ˆ t
 The two limiting cases together show that growth rate achieve its maximum under 
perfect substitution, but there is no growth at all under perfect complementarity. To 
complete our inquiry we have to examine interior solutions.  
 
4. Substitutability and Growth: Interior Solutions  
This section has two simple objectives. First we prove the existence of interior-solution 
equilibrium where the skilled and unskilled professions are non-empty. Second we show 
15 
 that the manufacturing revolution, via gradual substitution of the unskilled by the skilled, 
hastens long-term growth. 
 
4.1. Existence of Interior-Solution Equilibrium 
There are different ways to depict degrees of substitutability in the constant returns to 
scale production function . Let )](),([)( tntsftx = constant)](),([ =tntsf
2
 define the 
system of the constant product curve (isoquant) on the 0ns plane. For our purpose it 
suffices to work with the curvature ( > 0) of the isoquant.2 /)(tsd )(tdn 11 A production 
function exhibiting easier substitution between s and n would be less curved, becoming a 
straight line with constant slope in the limiting case of perfect substitutes. The intuition of 
easy substitution is that when a factor's supply (in effective skilled units) increases, it is 
more easily absorbed into the production process, thus necessitating a relatively small 
perturbation in the marginal rate of substitution and relative wage rates. 
Following the last section our focus remains firmly on , which links endogenous 
career choice to human capital accumulation. Long-term interior-solution equilibrium is 
defined by 
)(ˆ ta
constant)(ˆ == ata  for all ...,2,1,0=t , 10 << a  strictly. It is “interior” in the 
sense that the two professions are strictly non-empty. From equation (9) the long-term 
rate of human capital accumulation is 0)
22
1)(/)]
2
>=+− gaatht
(
(= δ()1( −+ hth
)](/) tst
[ . 
Writing [)()](),([)( ntstntsftx φ== , since 2/)1)(()()( 21 athdiathts
a i
−== ∫ , it 
is easily seen that in the long-term equilibrium (if one exists) the following relation holds 
. 0)( >th/)]()1([)(/)]( −+=− ththtsts)1([ +ts
16 
  Consider a system of isoquants having a finite curvature , but 
we are allowed to compare ‘neighboring’ systems with different curvatures.
0)(/)( 22 >>∞ tdntsd
12 Suppose at 
time τ  human capital accumulation has reached an arbitrary level )(τh and endogenous 
career choice is aa =)(ˆ τ . This configuration would be a long-term equilibrium if 
aa )(ˆ =τ  for all τ>t . If it exists, in this equilibrium atn =)( , atz −= 1)( and 
2/)21)(()( atts −h=  for all τ>t . Although s grows at a constant rate g, they are 
absorbed completely into the skilled profession. The increasing supply of s continuously 
reduces wage  per effective unit of s, yet no skilled worker finds it worthwhile to shift 
to the unskilled profession since the fall in  is exactly offset by the rise in h. 
sw
sw
 To prove the existence of such an equilibrium, suppose in the system just described 
ετ +=+ aa )1(ˆ  where ε  is an arbitrarily small constant. The growth of efficient units of 
skilled labors during τ  must have so depressed relative wages  in ns ww / 1+τ  that a 
larger number of citizens than in τ  find it worthwhile to remain unskilled. Now if we 
allow the system to be replaced by ones with continuously reducing curvatures, the fall in 
 between ns ww / τ  and 1+τ  approaches zero as  approaches zero. The 
existence result follows from the finiteness of 
2)2 (/)( tdntsd
ε  and the fact that the curvature 
asymptotically approaches zero (linear isoquants when s and n are perfectly substitutes). 
 
4.2. Characterization of The Interior-Solution Equilibrium 
If the production systems are sufficiently compact such that curvature  is continuous 
and differentiable, it follows from the argument just presented that there exists a 
continuum of such equilibria each identified by its degree of substitutability between s 
ic
17 
 and n (the curvature of its isoquants). Each of these equilibria will be characterized by a 
different career configuration a . Human capital and income will grow at a different rate 
according to a . 
 Again we rank such equilibria in terms of the curvature of their isoquants  such 
that c  for 
ic
ji c< ji . Consider two neighboring equilibria i and j where . The 
greater substitutability of  allows a larger fraction of the population as skilled labor (by 
analogous reasoning presented in subsection 4.1). In other words 
< jcic <
ic
ji a>a  holds. It 
follows immediately from (9) that human capital grows faster under equilibrium i 
compared to j. This argument is readily extended to all equilibria, and it allows us to 
conclude that long-term human capital and income grow at a higher rate when the skilled 
become more substitutable for the unskilled.  
 
5. Between- and Within-Group Inequality  
Several papers have recently offered alternative ways to understand the relations between 
technological change, growth and wage inequality (Acemoglu (1998), Eicher (1996), 
Eicher et.al. (2001), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), and Galor and Moav (2000)). Our model 
presented above shares several characteristics in common with these papers, in particular 
differential innate ability and the convexity arising from human capital accumulation. 
None of these papers examine the manufacturing revolution and the shift from the 
Taylorist to the modern organization. Our model is simpler than those just cited. It 
suffices however to bring out the links between human capital accumulations, within- and 
between-group wage disparities in a stark and intuitive manner.  
18 
 It is important to recognize that the ith skilled worker’s income is , 
not . Owing to the uniform distribution of 
)()()( thtatw i
s
)(tws ]1,[aai ∈ , we measure inequality 
(denoted snλ ) by the ratio of the mean skilled earning to the unskilled wage . 
Equilibrium mean skilled earning is 
)(twn
aahwhw ss /)−( . The between-group inequality 
measure is therefore. Using (7) we have 
2
)1()1(
a
a
a
a
w
wh n
s
sn
−=−⋅⋅=λ .           (14) 
 It is immediate that between-group earnings inequality is positively related to long-
term growth rate. Two intuitive reasons emerge clearly from the first equality of (14). 
First, a higher relative wage is exactly what is needed to attract more individuals to train 
for skill. Second, as more get enroll for training, this in itself hastens the social process of 
capital accumulation (h is higher). The first reason is well known. The second however is 
less obvious and seldom mentioned. 
The positive association between growth rate and between-group inequality is 
consistent with the empirical finding of Forbes (1998), although it differs from that of 
Aghion et. al. (1999). Our result arises however from an entirely different economic 
process than Aghion et. al. (ibid). They argue that inequality is bad for growth when there 
are imperfections in the capital market. Our point is that in the absence of such 
imperfections growth and inequality would be positively related. The final direction of 
association depends on the relative strength of these opposing pulls. 
 Now we turn to within-group inequality. Only that within the skilled group needs 
investigating, as unskilled wage and earning are uniform. Owing to the uniform 
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 distribution of ]1,[aai ∈ , within-skilled inequality (denoted sλ ) can be represented by 
the earnings gap between the top and the bottom skilled earners  
)1( ahwahwhw ssss −=−=λ .          (15) 
 The conclusion is immediate that within-group inequality is also positively related to 
long-term growth rate. This arises clearly from the fact that a greater mass of less able 
individuals is drawn into the skilled profession. The variance of intrinsic ability, in others 
words, must have risen. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions  
This paper is motivated by the simple question: Could the manufacturing revolution that 
we see sweeping across American organizations be raising the long-term growth trend? 
To study this we inserted a career choice mechanism into the Uzawa-Rosen-Lucas model 
of human-capital accumulation. The result turns out to be affirmative: Even abstracting 
from physical capital, the gradual substitution of the unskilled by the skilled suffices 
unambiguously to raise long-term growth rate. The virtue of our model lies with its 
simple intuition. The Taylorist, vertical organization structure preserves and maintains a 
sizeable army of the unskilled as an indispensable and complementary part of the 
manufacturing process. But the unskilled do not train. Its mass and its perpetuation 
negatively affect growth. In modern manufacturing, automated machines combine and 
complement with skilled labor, together and gradually they are substituting and replacing 
the unskilled. This emancipates as well as forces the unskilled to train and to accumulate 
human capital, which boosts growth. As the growth trend is raised, between-group wage 
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 inequality worsens as a necessary inducement to education. Within-group wage 
inequality also worsens owing to greater heterogeneity among the skilled. 
  Two caveats of our model are mentioned below. Both point to promising avenues 
for extension and future work, neither is likely to reverse the direction of our findings. 
First, our economic agent makes one single career choice as his/her life begins, by 
observing two simple signals - the prevailing relative wage and his/her ability to train. A 
richer model would allow him to maximize lifetime expected utility over a schooling 
period and a working period say, by forming some anticipated wage or even taking some 
spillover effects of human capital accumulation into account. Provided that wages do not 
shift wildly, and that the country is large enough for each to take spillovers as given, our 
simple framework should capture the main direction of the forces involved. The second 
caveat is the abstraction from physical capital. Automation as argued earlier is an 
important forces that substitute and shifts workers from unskilled into human capital 
accumulation. Since capital and skilled are known to be complementary, we simply take 
the skilled to ‘stands in’ for the process of automation. While we argue this approach is 
justified as a first attempt at the question at hand, it remains to study the full picture 
where human capital is accumulated in tandem with physical-capital. Such a task, 
however, is left for future research. 
 So the record-breaking run of US growth experience may be expected to last for a 
while yet, and the higher speed limit recently observed might indeed be ‘safe’. This 
finding should be exciting to many of us, not only in the United States but in other 
countries as well. Prevailing views have typically attributed this new growth experience 
to information technology (IT). We have offered a different perspective in this paper by 
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 emphasizing the substitution of the unskilled. IT has had tremendous impacts on skills 
and on human capital. It also has many unique characteristics of its own (e.g. network 
externality and switching costs). Combining IT with the manufacturing revolution is 
another rewarding avenue for furthering our understanding on growth. 
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Notes 
 
1 Milgrom and Roberts (1990) begin their article by proclaiming, “Manufacturing is 
undergoing a revolution.” They document many anecdotal evidence of this revolution. 
Two recent papers by Lindbeck and Snower (1996, 2000) study the origins of this 
organizational shift and its effects on wage inequality. 
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2 Aoki (1986) compares the Japanese, horizontal organizational structure with the 
American, vertical one. Lindbeck and Snower (2000) note that “This [Western] 
structure is increasing giving way to flatter organization” (p.375). 
3 The title of a Business Week article (April 10, 2000, p.242), “The Economy: A Higher 
Safe Speed Limit,” captures the imagination of many. Jogenson and Stiroh (2000) and 
more recently Gordon (2002) ascribe information technology as the driving force 
behind the change. Be that as it may, the general sentiment is one of bewilderment, as 
Lawrence Summers calls it, a “paradigm uncertainty.”  
4 The choice of my focus is partly a matter of taste and scope, but there is also the hope 
that this would lead to new insights on the relations between this manufacturing 
revolution, growth, and wage inequality. Fortunately this aspiration is positively 
rewarded, as I will show in Section 5 below. 
5 A wide literature in sociology pertaining to the degradation work and the alienation 
workers readily attests to this. See for instance Braverman (1974). Such alienation of 
the working class, documented in detail in Karl Marx’s Das Kapital (1867), lies at the 
heart of his thesis of class struggle and socialism. Such ideas also become obsolete in 
the face of the manufacturing revolution. 
6 Griliches (1969) formulates and provides initial empirical evidence on capital-skill 
complementarity. Bound and Johnson (1992) argue that technological change has 
biased towards the skilled and this is a major cause for the increasing relative demand 
for skilled labor. A large part of the debate in the literature has concentrated on 
explaining the widening wage gaps between as well as within skill groups. Levy and 
Murnane (1992) survey the literature and concluded that shifts in both supply and 
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demand for factors have contributed for the More recently Krusell, et. al. (2002) 
provide evidence that changes in input supplies alone can account for most of the 
observed skill premium. 
7 We could think of automation as taking place exogenously, and in such a way rendering 
the skilled (armed with automated machines) more substitutable for the unskilled. We 
know (a) capital and skills are becoming more complementary, and (b) automated 
machines are increasingly substitutable for the unskilled. Other things being equal, the 
skilled must be increasingly substitutable for the unskilled. 
8 One would like to seek empirical or historical evidence to verify or refute our finding. 
The recent record-breaking growth in the U.S. strengthens our position. On the other 
hand, automation and the horizontal organization form were adopted in Japan 
somewhat earlier than the U.S., yet Japanese growth has stagnated for almost a decade. 
Neither anecdote is sufficient proof one way or the other.  
9 The case of  can be dismissed out of hand for it is inconsistent with the 
definition of a skilled labor. To see this recall from equation (6) that the most able 
individual joins the skilled profession without training and offers  units 
of effective skilled labor power for employment.  would have implied that even 
the most able skilled worker is less productive as skilled labor than as unskilled.  
<th
1)0( =h 1)0( >h
)0()0()0( i
sz uww =
10 The text omits the only remaining case concerning initial human capital stock - 
. The analysis and result are identical to the case of  so we relegate it 
to a footnote. The skilled earning per head equation becomes . 
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Taking this into account, growth rates for human capital as well as national income in 
the three cases in equation (10) are 
 
   This reinforces the result derived in the text. 
11 The elasticity of substitution of the linearly homogenous production function 
 can be written as  where  is the marginal rate of 
substitution, and  is the curvature of the isoquant. The degree of 
substitutability between s and n is thus inversely proportional to the curvature of the 
isoquant (cf. Allen (1938), p.342). 
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12 Imagine we denote the ith production system in terms of its curvature , where 
, i . Imagine also technology is sufficiently compact such that  is 
continuously differentiable, and we rank them such that <  for . The two 
limiting cases are perfect substitutability - c , and perfect complements - . 
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